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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Defendant State of Utah (the "State") adopts plaintiffs' 
statement concerning the jurisdiction of this court for review of 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals by a grant of 
Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The State accepts and adopts plaintiffs' statement of the 
issues. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are believed to be 
determinative of the issues presented above: 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 54-4-14 through 15.4 
Utah Code Ann. Sees. 63-30-1 through 10 
23 U.S.C. § 409 
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The contents of the cited authority are fully set forth in the 
Addendum to this Brief in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State adopts plaintiffs' statement of the nature of the 
case and incorporates by reference the exceptions and/or supple-
ments to plaintiffs' statement of the course of the proceedings 
below made by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company in its 
Brief at pages 2-5, specifically items numbered 1, 2, 4. 
In addition, the State makes the following supplement to the 
plaintiffs1 and the Railroad's statement of the course of the 
proceedings below: 
Affidavits submitted by UDOT's Surveillance Team 
Plaintiffs suggest that automatic crossing gates had been 
recommended by UDOT prior to the Duncan accident but that instal-
lation was postponed until Federal funding became available. 
This mischaracterizes the actual sequence of events and the 
process for obtaining approval for upgrades. The uncontradicted 
affidavit of Ross D. Wilson states that the surveillance team 
decided to recommend that gates and signals be installed at the 
crossing at such time as federal funding became available and it 
was not the intention of the team that approval for upgrading be 
sought immediately, or that federal funding be sought for the 
Droubay crossing ahead of all other crossings for which the 
surveillance team had then recommended improvement, but for which 
federal funding had not yet been available. It was not until 
1983, after this accident and after the Federal Highway 
Administration standards had been changed, that there was a 
sufficiently high accident prediction rate to warrant application 
for federal funding. 
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Disposition of the Court Below 
Plaintiffs assert that the District Judge upheld the State 
immunity because the determination as to enhancement of warning 
devices was the exercise of a discretionary function, and thus 
trivialize the Court's ruling. The Court did not discuss 
"discretionary function" in terms of a simple decision whether 
enhance warning devices. District Judge Hanson actually held 
that: 
[t]he process is far beyond the perfunctory 
decisions that government officials may make 
on a day-in and day-out basis, which are not 
entitled to protection as discretionary deci-
sions. The process of evaluation involved 
here embodies the classic elements of a 
discretionary function, to wit: balancing 
various needs of differing railroad crossings 
throughout the state, weighing competing 
interests for available funding, [and] 
balancing potential risk versus dollar and 
manpower available. (Memorandum Decision, 
p.7; R. at 482) 
The District Court obviously acknowledged all of the classic 
elements of a discretionary function and found them to exist in 
this instance. 
Plaintiffs also state that Judge Bullock, in writing the 
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, assumed plaintiffs had 
stated a prima facie case of negligence. In footnote 14, Judge 
Bullock specifically stated that the court merely presumed for 
purposes of argument that plaintiffs had stated a prima facie 
case of negligence. (790 P.2d 600, n.14) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State adopts and incorporates by reference the 
corrections and additions to the plaintiffs' Statement of Facts 
set forth in the Brief of Union Pacific Railroad at pages 5-12, 
with the following supplemental facts: 
1. The three warning signs located on the approach to the 
crossing were reflectorized and visible at night from one-half 
mile to one mile away depending on whether low-beam or high-beam 
lights were used. (R. at 373). The speed limit on Droubay Road 
was 55 m.p.h. (R.431). At a sight distance of 1/2 to one mile 
from the warning signs, and an additional 305 feet to the track, 
a vehicle travelling at 55 m.p.h. would have more than ample time 
to stop before reaching the track (R.340-343). These calcula-
tions do not take into consideration the visibility of the 
train's headlights and flashing yellow strobe light or the 
audible warning of the train's whistle and bell, although the 
investigating officer testified by affidavit that tests conducted 
on evenings subsequent to the accident indicated that headlights 
on westbound trains could be seen for a distance exceeding two 
miles, and could be readily observed for several minutes before 
trains reached the crossing. (R.372) 
2. The State inspection team did not recommend in 1981 
moving signals from Bauer Road to the Droubay Crossing. While 
the team considered moving signals from the Bauer crossing (which 
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had been closed to the public) to the Droubay crossing, inspec-
tion of the signals showed them to be outdated substandard, and 
moving the old signals would have been almost as expensive as 
installing new ones, (R. 406) 
3. Plaintiffs mischaracterize the approval and funding 
process for installation of improved warning devices. The State 
has the responsibility to apportion the costs of active warning 
devices at public crossings between railroads and the govern-
mental entities with jurisdiction over the roads. The devices 
are funded 90% from federal funds and 10% from the local entity 
with jurisdiction over the road in question. (R. 407, 408) 
Approximately 15% of the 1,373 public at-grade crossings in Utah 
have active warning devices. Federal funding was generally 
available for only eight to ten projects each year. (R. 408) 
Thus, the State developed and used a Hazard Index Rating, 
approved by the Federal Highway Administration, as one means of 
determining the priority of a crossing for upgrading. (R. 408) 
The State uses an inspection team which, with railroad and local 
government representatives, performs on-site inspections of 
crossings throughout the state, using the Hazard Index. (R. 407) 
In 1981 The State surveillance team inspected the Droubay 
crossing, applied the Hazard Index Rating system, and found that 
the Droubay crossing would not, as compared with other crossings, 
qualify for federal funding that year but should be considered 
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for federally funded improvement at some time in the future, (R. 
404, 405) 
4. Making determinations regarding the existing, or 
predicted, hazards at railroad crossings was only part of the 
discretionary function performed by the Utah Department of 
Transportation through its crossing inspection and review 
process. (R. 405, 351) An equally important discretionary 
function was an analysis of all inspection team findings in light 
of available federal funding to produce a priority list of 
crossings where limited federal funds should be used. (R. 404, 
405) The memorandum of Ross D. Wilson (R. 351), in awareness of 
the requirement of establishing priorities, indicated that the 
Droubay crossing was not of sufficient priority to qualify for 
federal funding. It was not until 1983, after the subject 
accident, using a newly approved FHWA "accident prediction rate" 
as an additional factor, that the Droubay crossing reached 
sufficient priority to be recommended for federal funding of gate 
and signal installation. (R. 402, 403) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
AT POINT I 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in 
holding that the activities engaged in by the State of Utah were 
governmental and constituted discretionary functions and as such 
are protected by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This 
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decision is in accord with Utah Supreme Court precedent, 
legislative intent and sound public policy. 
AT POINT II 
The recognition of immunity for discretionary functions is 
mandated by the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and sound public 
policy. 
AT POINT III 
The immunity issue aside, the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals correctly held that the Droubay crossing was not 
"extra-hazardous" as a matter of law. For liability to exist for 
a crossing mishap, there must be something about the crossing 
that creates a hazard to motorists greater than the inherent 
hazard presented by the mere fact that the railroad and the 
street intersect at grade. There are no facts in this case which 
support the assertion that the crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S ACTIVITIES COMPLAINED 
OF IN THIS ACTION ARE DISCRETIONARY 
AND IT IS IMMUNE 
Sovereign immunity - the principle that the state cannot be 
sued in its own courts without its consent - was a well-settled 
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principle of American common law at the time Utah became a state. 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 492-93, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-1, 
et seq., which became effective in 1966, reaffirmed governmental 
immunity Mfor any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function," subject only to express statutory 
waivers, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Governmental immunity exists if: (1) the injury resulted 
from the exercise of a "governmental function,"1 and (2) immunity 
has not been otherwise waived by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiffs argue that recent cases expand the State's 
liability and that the immunity for discretionary functions which 
is retained by § 63-30-10(1)(a), is superseded by § 63-30-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, which states, in pertinent part: 
Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe or dangerous condition of 
any highway, . . . or other 
structure located thereon. 
Plaintiffs cite Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 
1985) and Biqelow v. Inqersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), for the 
proposition that the Utah Supreme Court has held that the express 
immunity waiver of § 63-30-8 is not modified by discretionary 
defined as activity "of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency or that is essential 
to the core of governmental activity," Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980) 
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function immunity provided by § 63-30-10(1)(a). Neither case so 
held. There is no case which expressly holds that § 63-30-8 
stands on its own and is not qualified by § 63-30-10(1)(a), at 
least where, as in this case, the claim is premised on merely 
negligent conduct of governmental employees. 
In Biqelow, the lower court held that the State of Utah was 
immune from suit where it was alleged that the state negligently 
designed traffic control lights at an intersection where an 
automobile collision occurred. In Biqelow, traffic lights had 
been improperly synchronized, resulting in a collision between a 
left-turning car in which plaintiffs were passengers and an 
oncoming vehicle. This Court held that although acts of the 
state in designing traffic control systems involve some degree of 
discretion, the design of this particular system did not involve 
the "basic policy making level" so as to render the state immune 
from suit. While this Court discussed the contention that 
§ 63-30-8 was not modified by the discretionary function excep-
tion of Sub-Section 10, it did not so rule; the issue was never 
reached, the court simply holding that the designing of the 
improperly synchronized lights was not a discretionary function. 
In Richards the plaintiff alleged that a city was negligent 
in allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure vision at 
an intersection and that it negligently failed to maintain a stop 
sign. The court held only that maintenance of traffic control 
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devices is a governmental function and dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint for failure to comply with the Notice requirements of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the State's activities complained 
of in this action are "operational" not "policy-making", and 
therefore not discretionary, relying on Biqelow, supra, Richards, 
supra, and Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
However, each of those cases involved the improper design or 
maintenance of traffic lights or signs, activities clearly 
"operational" and not discretionary. 
This case, however, is controlled by Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988); 
and Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 
1970) . 
Velasquez is the seminal case in Utah dealing with the 
discretionary power of governmental entities in the installation 
of safety devices at railroad crossings. Velasquez was a 
passenger in a pickup truck involved in a crossing collision, and 
claimed the State erred in failing to require additional safety 
devices at the crossing. Affirming summary judgment in the 
State's favor on immunity grounds, the court found that the 
statutory directive prescribing the installation of "appropriate" 
safety devices, under Utah Code Ann. Section 54-4-14, indicated a 
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legislative intent to confer discretion on the responsible agency 
(at that time, the Public Service Commission). This court held 
that the statute gives the state the power to require a different 
safety device at the crossing in question, "but that does not 
mean that the plaintiff should recover simply because a better 
warning signal could or should have been installed." Id. at 6. 
Velasquez remains the law of this State. 
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah 1988), the Court of Appeals outlined the history of the 
tests to determine governmental immunity. Gleave held that the 
regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, installa-
tion, maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at 
railroad crossings is a governmental function, and in light of 
that holding went on to discuss whether UDOTfs allegedly negli-
gent failure to install different safety devices at the crossing 
in question was a "discretionary function" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). Holding in the affirmative, the 
court noted that the "discretionary function" exception was 
"intended to shield those governmental acts and decisions impact-
ing on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways 
from individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of 
which would make public administration all but impossible." 
Gleave, supra, citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 
1980). 
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The Gleave court applied the analysis2 of Little v. Utah 
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), and 
found that the State's decision not to install certain safety 
devices at a railroad crossing was a "purely discretionary 
function within the meaning of U.C.A. Sec. 63-30-10(1)(a)." 
Gleave, supra, at 669. 
Applying the Little test, the Court of Appeals held: First, 
the basic governmental objective involved in "installing, main-
taining, reconstructing, and improving" safety devices is the 
consistent promotion of public safety, a basic government 
objective. Second, the evaluation of crossings and assignment of 
priorities for upgrades is essential to the realization of the 
2(1) Does the questioned act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do 
or make the challenged act, omission, or 
decision? 
Id. 667 P.2d at 51. 
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protection of public safety, especially in light of limited 
funds. Third, UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise1' when evaluating railroad crossings for safety 
signal improvements and when deciding which crossings should have 
upgraded safety appliances first. In applying UDOT's safety 
policy, UDOT's surveillance team performs on-site inspections and 
weighs the numerous factors relating to crossing safety. The 
team consists of transportation experts who exercise their 
collective judgment and expertise in making their evaluations of 
the relative dangerousness of railroad crossings in Utah, taking 
into consideration their physical characteristics and configura-
tions, the volume and type of vehicular and train traffic, and 
other relevant factors. Fourth, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 54-4-14 et 
seq. (1990) empowers UDOT to supervise and regulate the safety of 
all the State's railroad crossings, including the authority to 
provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and 
improving of safety devices and signals there. UDOT clearly has 
the legal authority to use the monies available for safety signal 
improvement at the most dangerous crossings first, which means 
that other less dangerous crossings, such as this one, must await 
their turn for improvement. 
In Rocky Mountain Thrift, supra, the Utah Supreme Court's 
most recent decision dealing with discretionary functions, 
plaintiffs were owners of commercial properties along North 
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Temple Street. They brought an action against several govern-
mental entities for damages caused by defendants' alleged 
negligent mismanagement of flood waters during the 1983 spring 
runoff. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary 
judgment based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs 
appealed and this court, while remanding on other grounds, upheld 
the trial court's decision that the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the storm system was a governmental function. In 
distinguishing between the operation of a sewer system [which has 
been held not to be a governmental function] and the operation of 
a storm drain system, the trial court held, and this court 
agreed: 
The maintenance and operation of a 
city-wide storm drainage system may appear 
similar to that applied to a city-run sewage 
system, but on closer examination they are 
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct. 
First, operation of a flood control system in 
the Salt Lake valley requires a breadth of 
coordination that cannot reasonably be 
attained by private parties. Further, no 
private parties can deal with flood control, 
as they might sewage disposal, on an 
individual basis. Finally, the immediate 
threats posed to life and property by 
uncontrolled flooding make such operations 
uniquely governmental, almost equivalent to 
police and fire protection. This Court 
therefore finds that all activities relating 
to flood control management in City Creek 
Canyon are governmental functions for the 
purposes of construing governmental immunity 
under the Immunity Act. Rocky Mountain 
Thrift, supra, at 462. 
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This court then went on to a discussion of whether immunity 
had been expressly waived, and the "discretionary function11 
exception to any waiver of immunity. This court again agreed 
with the trial court that the design, capacity, and construction 
of the City Creek drainage system involved a basic governmental 
policy, program, or objective of flood control to protect life 
and property, and that defendants' acts and decisions required 
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise: 
The design of the City Creek drainage 
system is a uniquely discretionary function. 
Such design is the product of a balancing of 
policy factors including interpretation of 
data relevant to climate, rainfall, rates of 
erosion, etc., the development of appropriate 
design parameters and the economic resources 
that a community is willing to devote to a 
project providing a necessarily finite degree 
of protection. . . . These are precisely the 
activities for which waiver of immunity is 
denied, Id. at 463. 
This Court in Rocky Mountain Thrift applied the analysis 
approved in Little, and followed in Gleave, to determine whether 
an act or omission was a discretionary function. Like the 
drainage system in Rocky Mountain Thrift, a decision relating to 
the improvement of the railroad crossing in this case is a 
uniquely discretionary function. The decisions of the State 
relating to upgrading the crossing requires a balancing of policy 
factors including interpretation of data relevant to locale, 
traffic, accident history, accident prediction, and the evalua-
tion of economic resources that a community is willing to devote 
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to a project providing a necessarily finite degree of protection. 
These are precisely the types of functions for which immunity 
must be retained, as recognized by Rocky Mountain Thrift, Gleave, 
and Velasquez. 
Velasquez, Gleave, Rocky Mountain Thrift and Duncan all fall 
into a category completely distinct from the situations arising 
in the cases cited by plaintiffs. Richards, Bigelow, and Bowen 
all involve design or maintenance of traffic signals or signs, 
while Velasquez, Gleave, Rocky Mountain Thrift and Duncan all 
involve policy decisions dependent on limited funds and based on 
numerous factors affecting large numbers of people in a myriad of 
unforeseeable ways. Evaluating all of the approximately 1,373 
railroad crossings in the state and assigning priorities for 
crossing upgrades is essential to the realization of the protec-
tion of public safety, especially in light of the fact that there 
are not unlimited funds available to upgrade all needy crossings 
at once. The State has, and must have, discretion to compare 
each crossing in the state with all other equally hazardous or 
more hazardous crossings for the allocation of limited funds. 
This key function goes far beyond mere responsibility for repair 
of a fallen or obscured sign. 
The activities of the State in prioritizing crossings for 
upgraded warning devices are clearly discretionary and the 
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immunity provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act protect the 
State when it is involved in such activities. 
POINT II 
IMMUNITY FOR DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTIONS IS MANDATED BY SOUND 
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
The Utah Supreme Court "has followed the lead of cases 
interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act by distinguishing 
between those decisions occurring at a broad, policy-making level 
and those taking place at the implementing "operational" level." 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).3 
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964) and 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act § 63-30-10(I)(a) (1987) 
provide nearly identical provisions excepting the government from 
liability for injuries arising out of discretionary acts. 
Federal courts, in discussing the discretionary functions 
protected by the Federal Tort Claims Act, have pointed to the 
3Thus, this court may properly look to decisions of the 
Federal Courts which have interpreted the Federal counterpart to 
§ 63-30-10, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), particularly as it has been 
applied to highway design cases. The following cases have held 
activities similar to those here involved to be discretionary, 
and the government immune: ARA Leisure Services v. U.S., 831 
F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1987)(guardrail); Bowman v. U.S., 820 F.2d 
1393 (4th Cir. 1987)(guardrail); Patton v. U.S., 549 F.Supp 36 
(W.D. Missouri 1982)(speed limit, design of curve); Miller v. 
U.S., 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1983) Cert.den., 104 S.Ct. 352 
(approval of plans, guardrail, shoulder width, warning signs); 
Wright v. U.S., 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977)(location and 
construction of bridge and approach roads). 
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separation of powers doctrine as a proper foundation for such an 
exception to waivers of immunity. 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 97 L.Ed 1427, 73 S. 
Ct. 956 (1953) outlined the boundaries of discretionary immunity 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and recognized the separation 
of powers doctrine as a basis for the discretionary function 
exception. 
In following the Dalehite decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the discretionary function exception was plainly 
intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government 
acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private 
individuals. 
This emphasis upon protection for regulatory 
activities suggests an underlying basis for 
the inclusion of an exception for discre-
tionary functions in the Act: Congress 
wished to prevent judicial "second-guessing11 
of legislative and administrative decisions 
grounded in social, economic, and political 
policy through the medium of an action in 
tort. By fashioning an exception for dis-
cretionary governmental functions, including 
regulatory activities, Congress took "steps 
to protect the Government from liability that 
would seriously handicap efficient government 
operations." (citations omitted) 
U.S. v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 104 S.Ct. 
2755, 2765 (1984) . 
Where the discretionary function provision of the 
Governmental Immunity Act conflicts with other provisions of the 
Act, the discretionary function provision should control. Utah 
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law calls for a harmonizing of conflicting statutory provisions, 
indicating that the provisions "should be considered together and 
it is proper to examine into the background and purpose as well 
as to the language of the statute to discover what the legis-
lative intent was as to which should have priority." Worthen v. 
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). This 
investigation into background, purpose and intent takes into 
consideration the relative weight of the arguments underlying 
each of the conflicting statutory provisions. The discretionary 
function provision should be given priority over other more 
general provisions. 
There has historically been a preference for specific 
statutory provisions over general provisions. Williams v. Public 
Service Com'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). This court has 
discussed statutory construction in terms of the general purposes 
statutes are intended to serve: 
[Sjtatutes are necessarily stated 
in general terms. . . . [0]ften 
there is neither the prescience to 
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility 
of language to cover with exacti-
tude, all of the exigencies of life 
which may arise. For this reason 
one of the fundamental rules of 
statutory construction is that the 
statute should be looked at as a 
whole and in the light of the 
general purpose it was intended to 
serve; and should be so interpreted 
and applied as to accomplish that 
objective. In order to give the 
statute the implementation which 
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will fulfill its purpose, reason 
and intention sometimes prevail 
over technically applied 
literalness. 
Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 1965). 
The discretionary function exception should prevail over 
other more general statutory provisions such as § 63-30-8 or 
§ 63-30-9 which broadly waive immunity for "any injury" caused by 
defective "highways, bridges or other structures" or "public 
building, structure, or other public improvement," respectively. 
While § 63-30-10(1)(a) in and of itself may not provide greater 
specificity than other provisions of the Act, § 63-30-10 with its 
elaborate system of waivers for negligence and its detailed set 
of exceptions to waiver does provide a more specific statutory 
scheme for determination of governmental immunity. 
To hold that there is no immunity where the State engaged in 
a discretionary function would require judicial second guessing 
and would defeat the purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
which is to insulate governmental entities from liability for 
actions taken for the over-all public good and which require 
policy-making rather than operational decisions. To abrogate 
immunity in such circumstances simply because a railroad crossing 
is dangerous would require the State to make safe every railroad 
crossing in the state, regardless of locale, traffic, accident 
history or accident prediction. Indeed, the only way to insure a 
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perfectly "safe" railroad crossing would be to construct an 
overpass, a fiscal impossibility. 
There is, obviously, a broad spectrum of governmental 
activities relating to highways, from repairing chuckholes to 
deciding to build multi-lane freeways, to prioritizing the 
improving of railroad crossings. The failure to repair a 
chuckhole does not require any policy-making analysis and, 
presumably, is not protected by discretionary function immunity. 
On the other hand, the decision to build a multi-lane freeway 
which would admittedly be "safer" than the existing two-lane 
road, requires the balancing of policy factors including 
interpretation of data relevant to locale, traffic, accident 
history, accident prediction, and allocation of economic 
resources; clearly a discretionary act. 
The fact that a road, or a railroad crossing, can be made 
safer does not make the road or crossing defective. Every 
railroad crossing, by its very nature, is dangerous.4 However, as 
the Court of Appeals pointed out, 
it is obvious that every railroad crossing is 
hazardous, but, since it is not practicable 
to eliminate all railroad crossings, the 
simple existence of a railroad crossing is 
not in itself a breach of a duty of care. 
4
"Dangerous" means "exposing to or involving danger; able or 
likely to inflict injury." In discussing synonynms, Webster says 
"dangerous applies to something that may cause harm or loss 
unless dealt with carefully." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary. 
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Much of everyday life presents hazards; 
driving or walking along a street are 
hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity, 
and many other things, but we tolerate those 
hazards because of the impracticability of 
eliminating them.11 
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 790 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah 
App. 1990). To hold the UDOT liable in the instant case would 
allow judicial second-guessing, with 20-20 hindsight, of 
functions entrusted by law to the agency of the executive branch 
possessing the requisite expertise - an unwise and unwarranted 
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURTS APPROPRIATELY 
FOUND THAT THE CROSSING WAS NOT 
"EXTRA-HAZARDOUS" AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that 
the crossing was not "extra-hazardous" as a matter of law, and 
therefore no duty existed to take added precautions. 
Plaintiffs argue that the lower courts should have 
considered the affidavit of their "expert," Robert Crommelin, who 
concluded that the crossing warranted additional safeguards, 
specifically automatic crossing gates. 
In considering the Statefs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Judge Hanson found that the Crommelin affidavit could not be 
considered because it was based on inadmissible evidence and 
misinformation; but more importantly, the crossing did not meet 
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the Supreme Court test as outlined in Bridges v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 488 P.2d 738 (Utah 1971), and followed in Hobbs v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984), that 
there must be something unusually hazardous about the crossing. 
The District court ruled that even if the affidavit were 
considered, the case should be dismissed on its merits. The 
Court of Appeals addressed the confusion concerning the standard 
of care in making railroad crossings safe for motorists to cross. 
The confusion arises from the use of the words "more than 
ordinarily hazardous," which were used in applying the standard 
of care in two Utah cases, Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 
supra, and English v. Southern Pacific Co./ 13 Utah 407, 45 P.47 
(1896) . 
These words were never intended to impose a 
standard of care higher than ordinary care, 
the degree of care exercised by a reasonable 
person under the circumstances. . . . In 
determining what is reasonable under the 
circumstances of a railroad crossing, it is 
obvious that every railroad crossing is 
hazardous, but, since it is not practicable 
to eliminate all railroad crossings, the 
simple existence of a railroad crossing is 
not in itself a breach of a duty of care. . . 
. [T]he question is not whether a hazard 
existed, but rather whether, under prevailing 
community standards the defendant should bear 
the responsibility to discover and ameliorate 
a hazard, in light of the practicability of 
doing so and the costs and benefits to 
society of requiring the defendant so to act. 
In the case of railroad crossings, the cost 
of eliminating the hazard, such as by 
installing overpasses at all railroad 
crossings, including rural ones, does not 
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warrant a duty of care so rigorous that 
simply having a railroad cross a street is 
tortious. Rather, for a railroad to be 
liable for a crossing mishap, there must be 
something about the railroad's right of way 
that creates a hazard to motorists greater 
than the hazard presented by the simple fact 
that the railroad and the street intersect. 
Duncan, supra, at 598-599. 
The Bridges court held that "there must be evidence to 
indicate that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, 
i.e., there must be something in the configuration of the land, 
or in the construction of the railroad, or in the structures in 
the vicinity, or in the nature or amount of the travel on the 
highway, or in other conditions, which renders the warning 
employed at the crossings inadequate to warn the public of 
danger." 488 P.2d at 739. 
The kinds of obstructions, traffic problems and "other 
conditions" which might render a crossing extra-hazardous are 
described in earlier cases decided by this Court. In Pippy v. 
Oregon Short Line R.R., 11 P.2d 305 (Utah 1932) and Toomer's 
Estate v. Union Pacific R.R., 239 P.2d 163 (Utah 1951), the 
crossings were found to be more than ordinarily hazardous because 
(1) the railroads had created obstructions to view of the oncom-
ing trains on an adjacent track right up next to the crossing; 
(2) there were electrical signals present at the crossings which 
the drivers relied upon and which failed to work; (3) the trains 
were speeding greatly in excess of a city-imposed speed limit; 
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(4) there was excessive noise being emitted by adjacent railroad 
operations which tended to drown out any warning signals being 
emitted by the oncoming train; and (5) there were other circum-
stances which the courts held tended to confuse the motorist into 
thinking it was safe to cross when it was not, or made it 
impossible for the drivers to safely make such a determination. 
The determination of whether a crossing is extra-hazardous 
is, in the appropriate case, initially for the Court to make as a 
matter of law. In Bridges it was noted that the Court may 
"authorize" a jury to consider the extra-hazardous crossing issue 
only after the court first determines that there is probative, 
admissible evidence showing the existence of such a crossing. If 
the Court concludes that there is no such evidence, it may rule 
that the crossing is not more than ordinarily hazardous as a 
matter of law. Id. at 488 P.2d 739. After reviewing the file, 
Judge Hanson found that the photos and investigating officer's 
tests and observations all showed that the surrounding land in 
the area of the automobile's approach was flat, at least to the 
extent that approaching trains can be readily seen and observed 
by the driver of an automobile. There are no buildings or other 
structures in the area to divert a driver's attention, or to 
otherwise confuse. There are no lights or unusual noises to 
confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver. There was 
nothing about the crossing that could provide notice to UDOT 
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personnel that the warnings which were there at the time of the 
accident were not adequate to warn the public. "While any 
railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to imagine a 
crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in question 
before the Court." (Memorandum Decision at pages 10-11; R. 478-
479) . 
The Crommelin Affidavit cannot properly be considered as 
probative evidence because it relies upon both false and inadmis-
sible "facts" in reaching the conclusion that the crossing was 
extra-hazardous. 
Crommelin relied on demonstratably false "fact" that "as 
many as 1,500 vehicles traversed the railroad crossing per day" 
(R. 189). The UDOT records clearly show that the 1,500 vehicles 
per day number was only an "expected" anticipated increase which 
never materialized. The actual count that Crommelin should have 
relied upon, as more specifically set forth in the Statement of 
Facts, was only 580 vehicles per day.5 
The unreliability (and hence the inadmissibility) of the 
Crommelin Affidavit is underscored by its assertion that the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices mandates that the 
railroad advance warning sign be placed at least 750 feet away 
Vehicular traffic volume is one of the key factors used in 
the Hazard Index. 
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from the crossing. The MUTCD neither mandates nor requires such 
sign placement. 
While § 8B-3 of the Manual provides that such a sign is 
"normally" 750 feet or more in advance of the crossing in rural 
areas, that same section also states that placement of such a 
sign shall be in accordance with § 2C-3, which only suggests that 
in rural areas "warning signs should normally be placed about 750 
feet in advance of the hazard or conditions/1 and goes on to note 
that warning signs may be placed as far as 1500 feet or as close 
as 250 feet depending upon the nature of the locale and the 
prevailing speeds. Section 2C-3 further provides: 
The actual advance warning distance will be 
determined by two factors, the prevailing 
speed and the prevailing condition. These 
bear respectively on the time available to 
the driver to comprehend and react to the 
message, and the time needed by him to 
perform any necessary maneuver. 
It should also be noted that the table found in § 2C-3 
titled "a guide for advance warning sign placement distance" 
provides for distances for warning signs in areas where the 
posted speed is 55 miles per hour to be anywhere between 700 and 
300 feet, with 450 suggested if it may be necessary for the 
driver to stop. 
Implicit throughout the entire MUTCD is the notion that, 
while the manual provides standards and guidelines, it is not a 
-27-
substitute for engineering judgment. One of the preliminary 
sections, § 1A-4, states that: 
The decision to use a particular device at a 
particular location should be made on the 
basis of an engineering study of the 
location. Thus, while this manual provides 
standards for design and application of 
traffic control devices, the manual is not a 
substitute for engineering judgment. It is 
the intent that the provisions of this manual 
be standards for traffic control devices 
installation, but not a legal requirement for 
installation. 
Section 1A-5 also defines the words "shall" and "should." 
"Shall" means a mandatory condition whereas the word "should" 
means an "advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory." A 
review of the manual as it relates to the placement of the 
railroad crossing advance warning signs nowhere uses the word 
"shall," but only the word "should" and thus, at least as to 
distances that such signs are to be located in advance of the 
railroad crossing, there is no mandatory minimum distance. 
Last but not least, Section 2C-3 provides that "the 
effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be 
tested periodically under both day and night conditions." In 
this case it is uncontradicted that, within a few days after the 
subject accident, the highway patrol undertook a nighttime 
evaluation of the crossing and the signs, including the advance 
warning sign and the crossbucks, and found them clearly visible 
at one mile away if the vehicles lights were on high beam. With 
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the lights on low beam, all of the signs were clearly visible 
one-half mile away (2640 feet) or more than three times the 750 
foot distance which the Crommelin Affidavit claims the manual 
"mandated." There is, of course, nothing in the record to 
indicate that the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle should not 
have had his lights on high beam; if he had, he would have had a 
clear view of not only the advance warning sign, but also the 
crossbucks and the crossing itself at a distance seven times 
greater the 750 foot "minimum." Also, the stopping tests 
performed by the Highway Patrol clearly show that the lesser 
distance of 305 feet was more than adequate for reaction time and 
maneuvering to stop a vehicle travelling at 55 m.p.h. 
Further, as noted by the District Court at p.9 of its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 450), placement of the sign at 305 feet 
as opposed to 750 feet could not possibly have been a proximate 
cause of the accident, because the undisputed facts show that 
plaintiffs totally ignored the warning signs which were clearly 
and readily noticeable at a distance of up to one mile (5,280 
feet) away from the crossing. Plaintiffs offer no explanation of 
how placement of the advance warning sign an additional few hun-
dred feet away from the crossing would have made any difference 
with respect to how the accident vehicle was operated as it 
approached the crossing. 
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Crommelin's reliance on the other accidents occuring at the 
crossing is also in error. Each of the accidents was totally 
dissimilar in its surrounding circumstances. Accordingly, if 
Crommelin's conclusion was based in any material degree on such 
an erroneous assumption, the conclusion is without proper 
foundation, and therefore, inadmissible. 
In addition to the above described misstatements of 
foundational facts, the affidavit also improperly relies upon 
evidence which is statutorily inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409 (Addendum). The obvious public policy intent of 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409 is to promote candor between governmental officials and 
railroads regarding applications submitted by state and local 
governments for federal funds to enhance safety at railroad grade 
crossings. If highway officials and railroads must be concerned 
that information included in applications for federal funds will 
be used against them as "admissions" in damage suits based upon 
accidents at such crossings, such officials will be inhibited in 
making any such statements or applications or in preparing the 
underlying data used by the federal officials in passing upon 
such applications. 
The use of the phrase "for any purpose" in 23 U.S.C. § 409 
precludes the use of such reports by expert witnesses. In view 
of the remedial purpose for which the section was enacted, it 
would be extremely prejudicial to allow a party to get into 
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evidence through the "back door" of an expert's opinion what the 
statute prohibits from coming in as direct, factual evidence. 
The Crommelin Affidavit relies, albeit erroneously, upon the 
UDOT reports in concluding that the crossing is extra-hazardous. 
There is no question that the UDOT reports reflect the results of 
an investigation which was undertaken to determine the appropri-
ateness and feasibility of installing additional crossing warning 
devices through use of available federal funding. Accordingly, 
neither the reports nor any of the data contained therein can be 
relied upon either by way of evidence or argument, to support the 
contention that the crossing was extra-hazardous or that either 
of the defendants was negligent in failing to upgrade the 
crossing devices. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decisions of Judge Hanson 
and the Utah Court of Appeals granting summary judgment to the 
State of Utah should be affirmed. As a matter of law, the cross-
ing in question is not extra-hazardous. The Statefs activity was 
exclusively governmental and its decisions discretionary. The 
responsibility of the State to study and compare various railroad 
crossings and prioritize them for improvement is a discretionary 
activity and entitled to the protection of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
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ADDENDUM 
23 U . S . C . 
§ 4 0 9 . Admission as evidence of certain reports and surveys 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, 
schedules, lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifying1 
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential acci-
dent sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway cross-
ings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the 
purpose of developing any highway safety construction improve-
ment project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid high-
way funds shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State 
court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages 
arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed 
in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data. 
(Added Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 132(a), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 170.) 
1
 Probably should have a comma inserted. 
28 U . S . C . 
§ 2 6 8 0 . Exceptions 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall 
not apply to— 
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or 
not the discretion involved be abused. 
54-4-14. Safety regulation. 
The commission shall have power, by general or special orders, rules or 
regulations, or otherwise, to require every public utility to construct, main-
tain and operate its line, plant, system, equipment, apparatus, tracks and 
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and safety of 
its employees, passengers, customers and the public, and to this end to pre-
scribe, among other things, the installation, use, maintenance and operation 
of appropriate safety or other devices or appliances including interlocking and 
other protective devices at grade crossings or junctions, and block or other 
system of signaling, and to establish uniform or other standards of construc-
tion and equipment, and to require the performance of any other acts which 
the health or safety of its employees, passengers, customers or the public may 
demand, provided, however, that the department of transportation shall have 
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of 
Transportation Act. 
54-4-15, Establishment and regulation of grade crossings. 
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, high-
way or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be 
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corpora-
tion at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be con-
structed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the per-
mission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured; pro-
vided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully 
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission 
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe. 
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the 
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installa-
tion, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one rail-
road by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a 
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or 
street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or 
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types 
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall 
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses 
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its 
judgment it would be practicable, a sepairation of grades at any such crossing 
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which 
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the 
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall 
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or 
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public 
authority in interest. 
(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and neces-
sity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a 
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, 
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall there-
upon become a public highway and crossing. 
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of 
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the de-
partment pursuant to this section. 
54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty to 
provide. 
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall 
as prescribed m this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstruct-
mg, and improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or de-
vices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any 
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state. 
54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds 
for payment of costs. 
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used in 
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from fed-
eral sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in Section 
54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the 
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state. 
54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Appor-
tionment of costs. 
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in Section 
54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency in-
volved. Unless otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities, 
towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local 
agencies by the department shall be limited to the funds provided under this 
act. Payment of any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the 
basis of verified claims filed with the Department of Transportation by the 
railroad or street railroad corporation responsible for the physical installa-
tion, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device. 
54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Provi-
sion of costs. 
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its annual budget for 
the costs to be incurred under this act. 
63-30-1. Short title. 
ms act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act." 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a comminsion, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or, 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a con* governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential * 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
<b> A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) 'Injury'^means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(91 "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and prnvprnrnp^tfll pnti. 
63-30-4, Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury ^ 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such * 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations-
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contrac-
tual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights f ° M ^ ^ 
not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, M-<5U-l<Sf 
63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving prop-
erty. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery 
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title 
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any 
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or 
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved. 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ture, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
63-30-10, Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990], 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
1A-4 Engineering Study Required 
The decision to use a particular device at a particular location should be 
made on the basis of an engineering study of the location. Thus, while this 
Manual provides standards for design and application of traffic control 
devices, the Manual is not a substitute for engineering judgment. It is the 
intent that the provisions of this Manual be standards for traffic control 
devices installation, but not a legal requirement for installation. 
Qualified engineers are needed to exercise the engineering judgment 
inherent in the selection of traffic control devices, just as they are needed 
to locate and design the roads and streets which the devices complement. 
Jurisdictions with responsibility for traffic control, that do not have 
qualified engineers on their staffs, should seek assistance from the State 
highway department, their county, a nearby large city, or a traffic 
consultant. 
1A-5 Meanings of "Shall," "Should" and "May" 
In the Manual sections dealing with the design and application of traffic 
control devices, the words "shall," "should" and "may" are used to 
describe specific conditions concerning these devices. To clarify the 
meanings intended in this manual by the use of these words, the following 
definitions apply: 
1. SHALL-a mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the 
design or application of the device are described with the "shall" 
stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these 
requirements be met. 
2. SHOULD-an advisory condition. Where the word "should" is used, 
it is considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory. 
3. MAY-a permissive condition. No requirement for design or 
application is intended. 
8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4) 
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each road-
way in advance of every grade crossing except: 
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other 
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews. 
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing 
traffic control devices are in use. 
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective 
display of the sign. 
Placement of the sign shall be in accordance with Table II-1, Section 
2C-3 and Sections 2A-21 to 2A-27, except in residential or business 
districts where low speeds are prevalent, the signs may be placed a 
minimum distance of 100 feet from the crossing. On divided highways and 
one-way roads, it is desirable to erect an additional sign on the left side of 
the roadway. 
The W10-2, 3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel 
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a 
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more 
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be in-
stalled in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2, 3, or 4 signs on 
the parallel highway would not be necessary. 
VIH-12 (c) 
Rev. 5 
W10-1 
36" Diameter 
W10-2 
30" X 30" 
W10-3 
30" x 30" 
W10-4 
30" x 30" 
vm-2(c) 
Rev 2 
2C-3 Placement of Warning Signs 
Warning signs shall be erected in accordance with the general 
requirements for sign position as described in Section 2A-21 to 29. 
Since warning signs are primarily for the benefit of the driver who is 
unacquainted with the road, it is very important that care be given to the 
placement of such signs. Warning signs should provide adequate time for 
the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary 
maneuver. This total time to perceive and complete a reaction to a sign is 
the sum of the times necessary for Perception, Identification/under-
standing, Emotion f decisionmaking, and Volition/execution of decision, 
and is here referred to as the PIEV time. The PIEV time can vary from 
about 3 seconds for general warning signs to 10 seconds for high driver 
judgment condition warning signs. Table II-l lists suggested minimum 
sign placement distances that may be used for three conditions: 
TABLE II-1—A Guide For Advance Warning Sign Placement Distance1 
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Typical Signs for the Listed Conditions in Taole II-1, Condition A—Merge Right Lane Ends, etc, Condition B—Cross 
Road. Stop Ahead Signal Ahead, Ped-Xing, etc , Condition C—Turn, Curve, Divided Road, Hill, Dip, etc 
1 Distances shown are tor level roadwavs Corrections should be made for grades If 48-mch signs are used, the legibility 
distance mav be increased to 200 feet This would allow reducing the above distance by 75 feet 
2 In urban areas, a supplementary plate underneath the warning sign should be used specifying the distance to the 
condition if there is an in between intersection which might confuse the motorist 
3 Distance provides for 3-second P!E\, 125 feet Sign Legibility Distance, Braking Distance for Condition B and 
Comfortable Braking Distance for condition C as indicated in A Policvon Geometric Design of Highways and Streets. 1984, 
AASHTO. Figure 11-13 
4 No suggested minimum distance provided At these speeds, sign location depends on physical conditions at site 
5 Feet 
Condition A—a higher driver judgment condition which requires the 
driver to use extra time in making and executing a decision because of a 
complex driving situation; i.e., lane changing, passing, or merging. 
Condition B—a condition in which the driver will likely be required to 
stop; and Condition C—a condition in which the driver will likely be 
required to decelerate to a specific speed. The table is provided as an aid 
for determining warning sign location. The values contained in the table 
are for guidance purposes and should be applied with engineering 
judgment. The placement of temporary warning signs used at highway 
construction and maintenance sites is covered in Part VI of this Manual 
and the suggested minimum sign placement distances given in Table II-1 
may not apply to that group of signs. 
Other miscellaneous warning signs that advise of potential hazards not 
related to a specific location may be installed in the most appropriate 
locations since they are not covered in Table II-1. These include DEER 
CROSSING and SOFT SHOULDER signs. Minimum spacing between 
warning signs with different messages normally should be based on the 
PIEV times for driver comprehension and reaction. 
The effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be tested 
periodically under both day and night conditions. Figure 2-5 (page 2A-17) 
shows typical installations of standard warning signs. 
2C-4 Turn Sign (Wl-1) 
The Turn sign (W1-1R or 1L) is intended for use where engineering 
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(fi When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
